An Incremental Leap in Defence
Deployment of the Civilian Front
Elran Meir
INSS Insight No. 157.
January 20, 2010
In early 2010 the Israeli
public and the country’s enemies learned of two significant developments
with regard to the defensive capacities of the civilian front. It was
unofficially reported that the Israeli cabinet decided to distribute
personal protection kits to the general public starting in February
2010, over a period of three years, at the cost of some NIS 1 billion.
Shortly thereafter it was reported that the Iron Dome tactical defense
system, developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to intercept short
range (4-70 km.) rockets, succeeded in intercepting a mixed barrage
simulating Qassam and Grad rockets. It was also reported that consequently,
the system would be proclaimed operational in the near future and the
first batteries will be deployed in the coming months, initially in
southern Israel and later in the north.
These announcements follow
a series of other developments that collectively manifest a more serious
approach by the defense establishment with regard to the home front’s
preparedness to face the growing challenges of Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria,
and Iran. Among these are the intense local and national drills initiated
and managed by the IDF Home Front Command and National Emergency Authority
(NEA), which addressed various threat scenarios, including non-conventional
ones. These exercises demonstrated improved professional capabilities
of the different civilian and military agencies, and also familiarized
the public with what has to be done in emergency situations.
It was also recently reported
that the discovery and identification capabilities of the Arrow and
Patriot defense missile batteries have been upgraded, to grant greater
flexibility against long range ballistic missiles. This improvement
was tested in the last US-Israel joint exercise, Jennifer Cobra, which
also involved American radar units permanently stationed in Israel.
In addition, development of the Magic Wand medium range active defense
system continues, to reach operational status by 2012. Progress has
also been reported with regard to the national warning system, which
within the next two years is designed to produce more focused alerts
for smaller zones, to alert only those who are under real threat and
to allow the others to carry on with their routine.
These and other developments
indicate a planned, orderly, and consistent effort to enhance the defensive
preparedness of the Israeli home front. Within three years the gap between
the improving capability of the enemy to strike civilian targets and
Israel’s defensive capacities may well be narrowed significantly.
Obviously these defense capabilities do not stand alone and must be
measured together with the IDF’s deterrent and offensive posture,
which are contribute critically to the overall strategic response to
the security challenges.
This encouraging picture
of progress regarding the civil defense capabilities in Israel indicates
that Israel’s decision makers have finally come to realize that
in the age of asymmetric confrontations, civil defense has to be proportionally
addressed. Since 2006 there has been a meaningful shift towards giving
more weight to defense in general and to civil defense in particular.
Since the Second Lebanon War and the growing awareness of the Iranian
military challenge, Israel has invested more resources in constructing
a more viable military and civil defense capability than perhaps in
any period before. Overall, the general orientation is correct and balanced,
and the progress toward a systemic multi-layer strategic response is
noteworthy.
Nevertheless, a number
of reservations balance the optimistic picture:
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Developing active
defense weapon systems is of definite importance. However, the true
test will be in the actual pace and rate of their procurement and
deployment in the field. In order to create effective defense coverage
against the various reasonable threats, it will be necessary to deploy
large numbers of different types of batteries at a very high cost.
Yet it can be expected that the IDF’s force buildup will continue
to focus on deterrence and offensive capabilities. The rest of the
resources will first and foremost be allotted to the strategic active
defense systems, mainly against the Iranian threat. This will probably
mean a relative low priority to the tactical defense systems such
as the Iron Dome. According to various assessments, around 20 such
batteries will be needed to provide proper defense coverage in the
north and the south, costing in excess of NIS 1 billion. Full deployment
is not expected in the foreseeable future. Opponents of the tactical
defense system point to the discrepancy between the high cost of the
interception missile (tens of thousands of dollars per unit) and the
negligible cost of the attacking rocket. Thus, it seems safe to suggest
that the IDF will be slow and limited in deploying Iron Dome, which
will probably be perceived by the military more as a psychological
tool for external deterrence and internal moral boosting than as a
major defense solution.
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The economic consideration,
reflecting mostly the order of priorities, will also probably be decisive
with regard to distribution of the personal protection kits. Even
though the media reported that the process will be completed within
three years, it has not yet been fully budgeted and as of now the
kits can be given to no more than two thirds of the population, a
reason used until now to withhold the process This raises questions
as to the seriousness of the intent. If the decision is not implemented
in full, it might indicate that perhaps it was not more than a ply,
designed to create an optimistic image and to demonstrate that the
government is committed to provide the public with the protection
it needs and deserves. However, exposure of a gap between words and
actual deeds with regard to the home front is liable to generate mistrust
and lead to a negative effect on Israel's public morale consequently
its social resilience, which is measured by the society's ability
to bounce back and resume a normal routine quickly following traumatic
events. Enhanced resilience requires constant investment as an important
part of the overall preparedness during times of calm.
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This leads to a final
and crucial assertion: assembling the home front’s capacities
is not merely a technical matter of deploying active and passive defensive
means. In essence, it calls primarily for the establishment of a public
perception and attitude that will enable the civilians to stand up
and be resilient during the supreme test of war, when they are the
target of enemy assault. The words and actions of the leadership,
on the national level and the local level, also during peace time,
directly impact on the public’s trust and hence its resilience
and ability to cope successfully with the expected dire challenges.
This calls for a special kind of leadership, defined by Barry Dorn
and Leonard Marcus of the Harvard School of Public Health, as the
triangular model of meta-leadership needed for preparing the public
for emergency situations: meta-leaders take responsibility for leading
through the crisis; meta-leaders take action that builds community
resilience; and meta-leaders coordinate their work and communications
with other stakeholders. As long as it is not understood and inculcated
by the Israeli central and local governments that active, committed,
and reliable meta-leadership is the principal leverage to establish
civil societal resilience, which is the primary key to success of
the home front, the incremental technological leap in developing and
deploying defense systems will not answer the fundamental need and
will not suffice to meet the challenge.
