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Israel’s Lebanese
War: a Preliminary Assessment What were the origins of Israel's recent Lebanese War, how was it waged and fought, what lessons were drawn from it, and what is the future likely to bring? At the time of writing, just one month after the guns have fallen silent, a final assessment is not yet possible. But sufficient information is gradually emerging to answer at least some of these questions. Origins To understand the origins of the war, it is necessary to go back all the way to 1968. Until that time the Israeli Lebanese armistice, which had been established twenty years earlier, held so well that Israel's border with Lebanon was almost absolutely quiet. This situation changed when elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) started establishing themselves in Lebanon following the Arab defeat, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in 1967. The PLO's presence was reinforced after 1970, the year in which King Hussein of Jordan crushed the organization in his own country. As many as 5,000 Palestinians were killed. Many others fled as best they could, establishing themselves in Lebanon's refugee camps. From then on cross-border terrorism, in the form of raids, the planting of mines, and the launching of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel became the order of the day. Throughout the 1970s, Israel responded to these provocations by means of artillery strikes, bombing, and raids into Lebanon. Yet none of this had the desired effect of restoring peace and quiet; instead the country sank into a vicious civil war, and large parts of it fell under Syrian domination. The climax came in June 1982 when six Israeli divisions, with some 1,000 tanks between them, invaded Lebanon, taking just a week to reach Beirut. Again the outcome was not what Israel had expected. Not only did it fail to impose its will, but its forces became involved in a protracted counter-insurgency campaign against various Lebanese militias. In the end, fully eighteen years were to pass before the last Israeli troops finally ended their occupation of southern Lebanon in May of 2000 and withdrew across the international border. During this thirty-two year period, Israel's main enemies were first the PLO, then a militia known as Amal, and, from the mid-1980s on, Hizbullah. Like Amal, Hizbullah was rooted in the Shia communities of southern Lebanon and southern Beirut. Like both Amal and the PLO, it enjoyed Syrian support in the form of money, arms, and training. It was, however, much better organized than its predecessors, receiving weapons not just from Syria but from Iran as well. Once Israel had left southern Lebanon Hizbullah's declared objective in continuing its 'resistance' was threefold. First, it sought to free several thousand Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Second, it strived to 'liberate' Shaba farm, a small piece of territory which, against all evidence (including that of a specially-appointed UN Commission that marked the border on the ground), it claimed belonged to Lebanon. Third, Hizbullah, which is a political party as well as paramilitary organization (it even has two ministers in the Lebanese cabinet) had to show it was 'resisting' Israel so as to justify its own continued existence in the eyes of its own supporters as well as the wider Arab public. The War Just why Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah launched the raid on 11 July which marked the beginning of the war, and whether this raid was part of a wider plan in which Syria and Iran were also involved, will probably never be known. Suffice it to say that, since Israeli troops were not just killed (as had happened several times in the previous six years) but taken prisoner, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had no choice but to retaliate in force. Failure to do so would have brought down his government. It would also have led to new elections, and, by bringing about the disintegration of his Kadimah Party, recast Israel's political system in an altogether new and unforeseeable direction. Though the decision to retaliate in force was inevitable, it also meant that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was taken by surprise and did not have time to prepare properly. Of the entire vast order of battle, only five regular brigades were immediately available. Even these had spent many years carrying out counter-insurgency operations in the Occupied Territories; as a result, they had almost forgotten how to fight a real enemy. Some of the burden fell on the Israeli Navy which shelled Lebanon's coast and imposed a blockade, cutting the country off from the world. As it did so, one of its most modern vessels was hit by an Iranian-built surface-to-surface missile, suffering damage and taking casualties This was the first time in thirty-nine years anything of the kind had happened; proving how much the Israelis, who had not even switched on their electronic defenses, had underestimated their enemy. The most important part of the response, however, was carried out by the Israel Air Force (IAF). Highly motivated and superbly trained, equipped with the latest precision-guided munitions and even better command, control and communications, the IAF had been overflying Lebanon for years, gathering intelligence. Now it started the campaign by delivering a stunning blow to Hizbullah. Most of the tatter's medium-range (50 km. and more) missile-launchers were knocked out during the first forty-eight hours and the rest forced to take cover. The organization's central headquarters and several important communications-centres were also demolished, along with a large part of the Shia quarter of Beirut where they had been located. That accomplished, the rest of the IAF's operations were less successful. Several 'in depth' heliborne raids were launched, but none of them met expectations in causing the death or capture of important Hizbullah leaders and three helicopters were lost. Vast destruction was inflicted on Lebanon's infrastructure, roads and bridges in particular, but whether traffic from Syria to the west and from central Lebanon to the south was really brought to a halt is not clear. Above all, the IAF did not succeed in ending the hail of short-range rockets - some 3,500 in all - that came down on towns and villages all over northern Israel, causing considerable physical damage, driving several hundreds of thousands people from their homes, and paralyzing about one-third of the entire country. It is this side of the matter, above all, that has caused Israeli public opinion to turn against the IDF, the IAF included. Still the accusations are unfair. Given how numerous the rockets were, as well as the ease with which they could be transported, concealed and fired, stopping them was probably beyond the capabilities of any air force, however sophisticated and however well prepared. Originally the Israelis seem to have hoped to accomplish their objective-teaching Hizbullah, as well as that part of the Lebanese people which supported it, a lesson they would never forget - without engaging in large-scale ground operations. This explains why they only sent three brigades to their northern border, leaving the remaining two to deal with the insurgencies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; only gradually did they realize that these forces were far from enough. First one reserve division, then two more, were called up. Contrary to the fears of some, the men proved willing enough and there were few if any refusals to serve. Fulfilling the fears of others, the mobilization process did not come up to expectations. Years had passed since the men had trained together, and a great many of them were out of condition and had forgotten how to fight. Many kinds of equipment such as webbing, bullet-proof vests, ammunition, and communications gear were in short supply. The part of the logistic system responsible for class 1 supplies did not function properly either. It left thousands without either food or water for days on end, forcing them either to rely on handouts from the civilian population - those who had not fled their homes - or else to scavenge for what they could find inside Lebanon itself. In fact the defective performance of the IDF's logistic system was one of the main shortcomings revealed by the war. Without question, it deserves to be studied and corrected in the future. Even when one disregards logistics, though, IDF ground operations in southern Lebanon proved clumsy, heavy-handed, and slow. Very large forces - as many as 500-600 tanks with all their accompanying firepower - were employed. Partly for that very reason there was no attempt at surprise, no attempt at attacking the enemy from unexpected directions (only late in the war did the IDF start using its helicopters to land troops in Hizbullah's rear), and little or no cooperation among the various participating formations. Just who was to blame for these shortcomings is not clear. So unhappy was Chief of Staff Dan Halutz with his commander on the ground, General Udi Adam, that he fired him in the middle of the war. Adam on his part did not remain silent but blamed the Government and the Chief of Staff for holding him back and not allowing him to carry out his carefully-laid plans during the first days of the war. Adam's replacement was Halutz's own deputy, General Moshe Kaplinsky, but his appointment did not cause the situation to improve to any noticeable extent. Units continued to receive contradictory, ever-changing, orders. (The number of different ones received by just one with which I am familiar during a twenty-four hour period has to be seen to be believed.) Some forces never entered Lebanon, whereas those which did engaged in heavy-handed, frontal attacks against fortified Hizbullah positions. Though most of those positions were occupied in the end several were abandoned later on, demoralizing the troops who asked why they had to fight and die if their achievements were to be thrown away in such a way. Some of the difficulties the IDF experienced seem to have been due to the fact that the terrain is mountainous and unsuitable for armour (a fact, however, that should have been obvious in advance). Many others were occasioned by sheer confusion at the top, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, and senior commanders. At the tactical level, too, results proved disappointing. Though they came under massive bombardment both from the air and from the ground, Hizbullah members fought well. They stood their ground firing Russian-made Kornet missiles at the advancing Israeli Merkavas, inflicting casualties and destroying or disabling several tanks. Their bunkers turned out to be well-built with several openings to each one. When they left those bunkers, their skills at camouflaging themselves and fighting in the dense vegetation characteristic of the area proved at least equal to those of their opponents. When the war was finally brought to an end the IDF claimed to have killed between five and seven hundred Hizbullah members. Yet it had almost no prisoners to show; proof that it had not succeeded in taking them in the rear, blocking their escape routes, and demoralizing them. Above all, in thirty-four days of fighting the IDF did not succeed in ending the hail of Katyusha rockets. It did not even succeed in greatly reducing Hizbullah's ability to fire them; if the number of Israeli civilian casualties was limited, this was due less to any countermeasures or civil defense than to the fact that most of the population had fled, as well as the rockets' own extreme inaccuracy. Thus, not merely the IDF's own operations but those of its supporting organizations too can hardly been seen as a great success. Assessment Tactically and operationally, the IDF's ground campaign against Hizbullah in Lebanon brought to light many major shortcomings. The IAF did much better, especially during the first few days. Later, however, a shortage of suitable targets caused its effectiveness to decline; fighter aircraft worth tens of millions of dollars found themselves trying to chase individual cars and even motorcycles that might or might not carry Hizbullah members or transport rockets. The IAF inflicted quite heavy civilian casualties, but in the end it was unable to achieve the one thing that really mattered. Victory makes the victor stupid, whereas defeat or lack of success at least has the advantage that it holds the promise of future reform. Such reforms must start with better training of, and better equipment for, the reserve forces; there is no point in maintaining forces that are under-equipped, ill-prepared to fight, or both. The logistic system, tactical intelligence on Hizbullah's fortifications and emergency depots, civil defence, and emergency services are all in dire need of improvement. In the form of the 'Arrow', Israel currently has the world's only operational anti-missile system. Even assuming that it really deserves to have the term 'operational' applied to it, the system was designed to bring down Scud missiles returning to earth from high in the stratosphere; using it against flying pieces of pipe (which, in essence, is all that the Katyushas represent) is not only impossible but, at three million dollars per round, ridiculously expensive. Not surprisingly the question that really interests the IDF, as well as the Israeli public, is whether some other system can be found to shoot down incoming rockets and what that system should consist of. During the 1990s Israel, along with the US, put several hundred millions of dollars worth of research money into a laser-based anti-missile gun known as the Nautilus. An acquaintance who has been involved in the development told me it worked 'like a dream'; shooting down not only rockets but artillery rounds in mid-flight and rapidly shifting from one target to another so that even several rounds coming in simultaneously could be dealt with. However, the gun and its ancillary units were vulnerable to incoming fire and much too large and heavy to be rapidly shifted from one sector of the front to another. Range, too, was limited - depending on the weather and the amount of humidity in the air, it is said to be between three and six miles. As a result, so many units would be needed as to bankrupt the country. Confronted by these obstacles, Israel ended by dropping the entire idea. This did not deter the Americans. Instead they proceeded on their own, shifting to a different kind of laser which is supposed to result in a much smaller, more compact and more mobile, gun. Other options, such as adapting the Israeli-developed and constructed Barak missile (used for defense against air-to-sea, ground-to-sea, and sea-to-sea missiles) are also available. The technology involved is futuristic and the budgetary implications very large. On the other hand, public pressure to do something is intense; hence it is not surprising that the question of how to defend against rocket attack is being hotly debated both inside the IDF and by Israel's very large and very capable defense industries. Currently it is not at all clear which of the various options, if any, will be realized. Nor is it clear that the option selected, whatever it is, will in fact work against large numbers of rockets being fired in large salvoes across a considerable length of border. The Future Disappointed by the slow pace of ground operations in particular, and with the memory of the rockets being fired into their country still fresh, Israeli public opinion has been loud in demanding that the conduct of the war be 'investigated' and those responsible for the 'failures' taken to account. Abroad, too, there is a widespread feeling that Israel's campaign has not been a success, to put it mildly. As a result, another attack by Hizbullah, possibly involving its supporters as well, is seen as all but inevitable. Given the facts detailed in this article, much of the criticism appears to be justified. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that war is not a game of football in which a decision is reached by means of the number of goals scored on each side. Instead, it is the continuation of policy with an admixture of other means, a physical and moral struggle by means of the latter; in such a struggle the side with the strongest will wins. If anybody had predicted, a few days before the war, that in response to the capture of two of its soldiers, Israel would launch an air campaign all over Lebanon, mobilize three of its divisions and send them across the border, and keep up the pressure for over a month while taking thousands of rockets and suffering more than a hundred casualties in dead alone, he would have been considered stark raving mad. 'Stark raving mad' (majnun) was, in fact, the way many people in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world reacted to the Israeli attack. As the statements of several of its top leaders indicate, Hizbullah, too, was taken by surprise by the strength of the Israeli reaction. None of the organization's original objectives were achieved; instead Lebanon's infrastructure was left in ruins, some thirty thousand dwellings were demolished or damaged, several hundred thousand people were forced to flee, and about a thousand were killed. Bluster as he may, Nasrallah has good reason to think twice before engaging in another adventure of the same kind. Several of his public statements, notably the one in which he said that while Hizbullah is rebuilding its strength it is in no hurry to pit that strength against Israel, point in the same direction. Most encouraging of all is the fact that the ceasefire has held. As anybody familiar with the history of counter-insurgency operations, anti-guerrilla operations and anti-terrorist operations knows, in these kinds of struggles ceasefires tend to be fragile and hard to maintain; witness Vietnam, Afghanistan (both under the Soviets and the Americans), the Sudan, and Israel's own operations both in the Occupied Territories and Lebanon. The frequent inability to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant, the absence of front lines, and the fact that many irregular forces do not have strong chains of command capable of enforcing discipline all contribute to this result. In spite of these obstacles, since the middle of August all over southern Lebanon hardly a shot has been fired. This is not for lack of provocation. Israeli troops remained in the country for weeks, putting the lie to Nasrallah's promise to fight them as long as they did so; Israeli aircraft continue to fly over Lebanon as they have done before. In many ways the situation is reminiscent of the one that prevailed during the weeks and months immediately after the October 1973 War. Then, too, the Israelis were seen as having gained no more than a qualified success. Then, too, people protested and committees of investigation were appointed. Looking back, however, it becomes clear that the war broke the will of the most important Arab states to launch large-scale attacks on Israel. And that, after all, is the important point. The war of July-August 2006 may prove just one of many or, worse still, a prelude to the next round which some experts believe will be larger and more dangerous. As happened after 1973, however, it may also prove to be the last of its kind. At the time of writing, the jury is still out. May it remain so for a long, long time to come. Professor van Creveld is Professor of History at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and author of (inter alia) Defending Israel: A Controversial Plan Toward Peace (2004) and The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq (forthcoming). This brief article is based on hundreds of Israeli newspaper articles as well as an extensive correspondence with Israeli officers and men. Since all of the material is in Hebrew, footnotes have not been used. See also: “Inside Israel’s Army.” NOW. PBS. July 17, 2009. Video. http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/529/index.html |
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