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Stuart A. Cohen: Israel’s
Strategic Agenda and Challenges There are three discernable trends currently affecting Israeli decision making in terms of its strategic agenda, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, a research-associate with the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) told Canadian Institute for Jewish Research (CIJR) board members and staff during a talk given last November in CIJR’s Montreal offices. Cohen, who is also a leading expert on the relationship between the IDF and Israeli society, identified these trends as being of a geopolitical, operational and societal nature. After elaborating upon each of these Cohen went on to posit explanations as to what they purport to tell us about the unique challenges now facing the Israeli military, the Israel Defence Forces as an institution, and Israeli society. Prof. Cohen qualified his remarks by stipulating that he was not speaking on behalf of the Israeli government or any other agency. Rather, he insisted, the content of these remarks represent solely his personal opinion and perspective. Geopolitically, Israel finds itself one of many countries struggling to adapt to seemingly new political and economic realities that are asserting themselves throughout the world. “In the 1990s there was a general feeling that we had entered a new world order – an end of history, an era of peace. Certainly that of one-power hegemony”, Cohen said. “Today we see things differently.” Today, he maintains, the supremacy of the West is no longer assured. Europe is changing at a tremendous pace both culturally and demographically. Muslim influence, through sheer numbers, is asserting itself in both these areas and, as a result, is strongly affecting European Jewish communities, amongst others. “Even if Turkey does not enter the European Union, the Muslim and Islamic influences will be very powerful. I don’t think we can talk about the West in European terms as we previously thought we could.” Similarly in regards to the United States, Cohen questions the extent of its continued hegemony. From an economic perspective, he believes, it is doubtful. As well, America has not managed to assert its position in a number of areas. “It imposed its will with great difficulty in Iraq. It hasn’t in Afghanistan. Certainly, it hasn’t been able to do so with the Israeli-Palestinian problems.” Cohen also pointed out that we are living in an age when third world countries are becoming increasingly vocal in articulating and asserting their own perspectives and agendas. As a result, those countries that have in the past relied heavily on the United States - Israel being a prime example of this - can no longer feel as secure in doing so as they did before. “In 1991 we placed our lot on the right horse. Now we might have to hedge our bets. That is a geopolitical trend that, I think, is affecting us very much.” The issue of Turkey and its currently wavering relationship with Israel is another significant factor to be considered. This alliance, which in the past represented a victory for Israeli diplomacy, appears to be slipping away – a trend that can have far-reaching military consequences for Israel. Geographically, Turkey is strategically situated between Iran and Israel. Should Israel be forced to strike at Iran, the most logical and simplest way to do so is via Turkey. “Although this alliance isn’t gone yet, it certainly isn’t as assured as it once was.” Additionally, Israeli military secrets that were divulged to Turkey over the years are now being transmitted to the Iranian side. This in itself is a geopolitical trend having serious effects. A second trend challenging Israel’s strategic agenda is operational within a military context. The IDF had originally been built to fight conventional wars against conventional armies that were, for the most part, situated along its borders. This was something they did brilliantly in 1967 and in 1973. After the 1980s, it became clear that Israel would have to supplement its land and air forces to meet two additional military threats. The first of these is long range. Cohen reminded the audience that missile threats, similar to what Israel is experiencing today from Iran, have been around since the 1980s. These kinds of threats were, indeed, one of the primary motivations behind Israel’s decision to take out Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant in 1981. As a result of these long range threats, it became clear that Israel must build a defence against enemies who are not situated on its borders but who are quite capable of launching missile attacks from farther afield. “So we developed means and capabilities to meet this threat.” This included learning how to refuel in the air, the development of both a navy, because navies are more mobile and submarines are capable of launching counterattacks from beneath the surface which are more difficult to detect, and missile systems. “Now with the Iranian threat materializing further, we have to step up these programs.” But, unless Iran adds on nuclear warheads, what Israel is facing today, Cohen believes, are essentially the same kind of challenges it faced thirty years ago. A second threat that has been developing since the 1980s is what is referred to as sub-conventional warfare. This expresses itself in terror and guerrilla warfare. Intifadas I and II are prime examples of this as was the war in Southern Lebanon that took place in 1982. But, here too, Cohen feels, the Israelis managed with some success to develop the means of dealing with these challenges. Increasing intelligence surveillance and capacities was one such method. Israel is not alone in confronting this kind of warfare: the Americans and their allies are currently doing so, as well, in Afghanistan. But, even more alarming is that sub-conventional warfare has now given way to what is called hybrid warfare. “Hybrid warfare is conducted by an army that combines elements of conventional high tech, nonconventional, sub-conventional and low tech.” Cohen explained that the second Lebanese war was an example of precisely this. Hezbollah used a non-conventional force but included missiles as well as hi tech weaponry. It also placed itself among civilian populations which made it terror, yet at the same time deployed forces against Israeli cities and Israeli military targets. “It’s now a new setting. Israel has to relearn many military rules at an operational level in order to deal with this sort of enemy.” Although the issue of hybrid warfare is not unique to Israel – once again the Americans are similarly confronting this kind of enemy in Afghanistan – what is unique to Israel is that it is facing both hybrid forces across its borders as well as those emanating from an Iranian umbrella. “To my mind the principle danger in the evolving Iranian situation is not necessarily that Iran would strike at Israel. Although doing so would certainly be harmful… I think Israel could respond and retaliate.” The real danger, Cohen feels, is that these hybrid enemies – Hezbollah and Hamas -- who are presently being armed by Iran might combine their resources together with Iran in order to conduct simultaneous attacks upon Israel. “This is an operational challenge that Israel is facing.” It is also a challenge that Cohen feels is ongoing and that does not inspire easy solutions. A third trend that significantly relies upon Israel’s security agenda is one that Cohen calls a “societal trend”. It, too, affects not only Israel but all Western societies in that it goes to the heart of the Western response to warfare and death in general. Cohen contextualizes this by comparing today’s attitudes towards death with those held in previous generations. “In my father’s generation, death was natural. For instance, my grandmother had twelve children, only seven of whom survived.” Although every death was certainly tragic, society was much more accepting of this reality at that time. Today, the death of children, as an example, is no longer acceptable. This attitude similarly applies to battle deaths. Although World Wars I and II claimed thousands upon thousands of lives, there was never a rebellion. In contrast, today if five soldiers die in a helicopter accident, Cohen points out, this becomes a national disaster. It is expressions of this kind that indicate how we, as a society, have developed an aversion to casualties. “I must say that this is a very positive thing in that we value the sanctity of life.” But, Cohen adds: “Not only have we become sensitive to casualties on our side, we have also become sensitive to casualties on the other side. That is why very few people blinked an eyelid in WWII when Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed, but many people screamed at Operation Cast Lead.” Because of this, Cohen believes, we find ourselves living in an entirely new environment. What has also changed is Western society’s attitude towards the military. Increasingly, the military is viewed as a calling that is also a profession. As a result, professional standards and training are being applied. Because of this the military is no longer immune to public scrutiny. Additionally, society insists that the same rules that are applied to civil society be likewise applied to the military. “Just as I’m entitled to sue a doctor for malpractice if there is malpractice, perhaps I’m entitled to sue soldiers for malpractice if there is malpractice,” Cohen said. More and more the courts have indicated their agreement with this position by aligning military and civil laws. For example, if an officer through misjudgements causes the deaths of people under his command, the officer can be held legally responsible. Cohen maintains that this would have been unthinkable a generation ago, but today it is taken as a norm because attitudes towards the military have changed. “Our military are performing an essential task, but ultimately it is a job and we have to know that they are performing this job properly.” Although these attitudinal changes do not apply specifically to Israel, the fact that Israel has a conscript army increases the legal obligation placed upon its officers and the IDF to make certain that serious mistakes are avoided. After all, their soldiers are not volunteering for military service, it is a duty imposed upon them by the State. Given that the nature of combat is such that mistakes have and will, tragically, continue to be made, the IDF has become extremely vulnerable to complaints and even legal actions levelled against them by parents. Towards the end of the occupation of Southern Lebanon, four mothers did precisely that. “They spoke not as members of any political party, but as mothers. And they can do this because the IDF is a conscript army.” Besides increased casualty sensitivity, higher professional expectations and civilian intrusion contributing towards an alteration in relationship between the Israeli public and the IDF, another factor to be considered is the motivations expressed by young people regarding their allegiance to this institution. Today, 80% of Jewish eighteen-year-olds indicate a phenomenally high motivation to military service. This statistic has remained stable over the past twenty to twenty-five years. The difference, though, is that whereby twenty-five years ago, young people spoke in terms of patriotisms and defending the country, today they speak in terms of personal advantages. The IDF is viewed as an institution that can provide them with the right contacts that will further their social and professional advancement. As a result, Cohen maintains that “what has changed is not the act itself, but the reason for this act.” Because of this the IDF must now cater to these needs. If it fails to do so, the young people may no longer be as firmly committed as they were before. Having defined these three trends, Cohen went on to elaborate upon what Israel is doing to meet these challenges and how successful he feels they are in doing so. In the geopolitical realm, doubts about continued United States hegemony have led Israel to seek out alternative solutions. Greater effort is being placed on developing self-sufficiency – for instance, more home-grown products are being manufactured. But, Cohen concedes that there is a level to what Israel can do. “We are not yet able to build our own submarines -- certainly not nuclear submarines.” A second option is to try to make connections with others. India is one example, as is China. But, as Israel has learned, there are grave dangers associated with this approach. A number of years ago, Israel approached China regarding military cooperation. The Chinese were very interested because Israel possessed a great deal of American knowhow. The Chinese agreed to cooperate but only if Israel would provide them with a Falcon, a high-grade weapons system. When the Americans were informed of this they became extremely annoyed that the Israelis would sell an American-made product to a country that might use it some time in the future either against the United States or against an American ally like Taiwan. As a result, the United States forced Israel to annul the contract. Instead of gaining, Israel was obligated to pay up millions to China in compensation. As far as Israel’s response to the issue of hybrid warfare, Cohen believes that Israel is learning to deal with this operational challenge. “It learned its lessons and I believe it will be successful.” Regarding the Iranian threat and whether Israel should attempt to take out Iran’s nuclear reactors unilaterally, Cohen’s personal opinion is that Israel is not capable of doing that. Efforts should rather be directed towards influencing international opinion, especially in the United States, regarding the dangers posed to the Middle East and the world by a nuclear Iran. As he said, “Every country has to know its limitations.” On an operational level, Cohen maintains that the nature of military training has changed. “We are living in a time when you don’t need large tank formations.” Instead, what are needed today are small, highly specialized groups working in small units, who in turn are fighting against small units. “The Germans have a good word for this - Bandenkrieg – war of bands.” A consequence of these Bandenkrieg is that it places more responsibility on the lower ranks. As an example, an Arab ambulance comes hurling by a checkpoint with no apparent intention of stopping. There is a tired and hungry eighteen-year-old soldier guarding this checkpoint. This soldier has to decide whether that ambulance is not stopping because there is a terrorist inside or whether there is a pregnant woman who must be rushed to a hospital. This is referred to as a “strategic decision.” Besides himself there is only one other person available who can help him in this situation and that is his commander, a junior officer. This scenario represents a moral dilemma that is characteristic of this kind of warfare. These kinds of situations, Cohen maintains, are what make it mandatory to significantly increase the training of the junior officer corps. Prof. Cohen is confident this is being done. “We have the personnel who are prepared to take this kind of responsibility. From what I have seen of them, I am extremely impressed.” It is the societal challenges that Cohen maintains may be the most difficult to overcome. Israel today is very much influenced by Western thinking regarding the issue of warfare in general. This is a significant reality that cannot be overlooked or diminished. The question then arises whether Israel should go the way of most Western societies and do away with its conscript army by replacing it with a professional military. This dilemma is currently nagging at Israel’s policy makers. “The question asked in the past was: Can Israel afford not to have a conscript army? … My own opinion is that it is inevitable.” Prof. Cohen then elaborated upon what he feels are the main advantages of instituting a professional army as opposed to a conscript one. Economically, a conscript army is much more wasteful. “You conscript everyone, but you don’t need everyone.” For instance, 75% of young Israeli men are conscripted, but 27% of them are given honourable discharges just after one year of service. Their services are just not necessary. In a professional army you accept only those who you want. Although professional soldiers would have to be paid salaries, they would ultimately prove to be cost effective. Regarding female soldiers, he feels that on the whole they represent a waste of human resources since their talents are being essentially underutilized. As a result of these factors, Cohen believes it would be much more productive allowing these young men and women to be integrated into the workforce and contributing directly to the economy. Civic service is a good alternative solution to mandatory military service. “Religious young women are now showing us how this can be done.” Because these young women are exempt from military duty, they volunteer, instead, as teachers and aid workers making their own contributions to Israeli society. If civic duty was instituted, Cohen suggests “there would be no reason why Arab citizens and haredi (ultra-orthodox) men could not do this as well.” From a societal perspective, there are advantages and disadvantages to altering the status quo. On the one hand, the advent of a professional army would diminish parental criticism waged against the IDF which is impossible to do with a conscript army. But, on the other hand, the essential character of the IDF would be altered. The IDF has always been seen as a cultural icon and a great equalizer in Israeli society – integrating Israelis from Ethiopia, Russia and other disadvantaged countries. Cohen concedes that “these individuals are given their main chance of equality through the military.” Should Israel do away with mandatory service, some alternative way would have to be found to integrate these young people into Israeli society. But, according to Cohen one significant result of doing so would be the decrease in militarism in Israeli life -- a result that he feels would, on the whole, be a good thing. Machla Abramovitz is the Managing Editor of Israzine Israzine Interviews Prof. Stuart A. Cohen Geopolitical In light of recent
American arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, should Israel be concerned
about maintaining its qualitative military edge? You stated that you believe Israel is not capable of taking out Iran’s nuclear reactors on its own. If American and European initiatives do not work, what options are then available to Israel? Should diplomatic initiatives not work, Israel must concentrate on defensive measures. Operational How do the Israeli wars in Lebanon and Gaza fit into the larger scale of low intensity conflicts that took place in Bosnia and Chechnya, for example and that are presently taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan? What has Israel learned from these wars? Israel learned that it must engage in new modus operandi. Targeted killings are one example – especially via use of air power. Would drones fit into this category? Yes. What does India have to offer Israel? What does Israel have to offer India? What they have to offer each other are strategic depth, training facilities and. joint technological cooperation.
We are already participating in the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) – the use of communications technology to increase our knowledge of the battlefield and to shorten the distance between identifying a target and attacking it. Through the use of high tech communications systems, information from the battlefield is instantaneously transmitted to command headquarters. This data is then analyzed and becomes the basis for command decisions regarding military operations on the ground. A consequence of this is that Israel’s traditional method of conducting warfare has been altered in two ways: a) commanders are now directing not from the front, but from the rear, and b) commanders are being deluged with information. Critics suggest that so much information is difficult to analyze in real time and does not substitute for hunches made by commanders directing battles from the front lines. In regards to the RMA, what do you think are its advantages and disadvantages? Both the advantages and disadvantages are clear. With experience the IDF – like other armies, is learning to strike a balance. Societal Do you believe that there is an absolute end to conventional warfare in regards to Israel’s future military challenges? If not, given Israel’s low population rate, can it afford not to conscript all able-bodied individuals? Yes, it seems that conventional wars are becoming less important than are other non-conventional and sub-conventional types of warfare.
For women, the IDF is doing quite a lot, especially by creating mixed-gender units. What do you mean by “mixed-gender units”? Does this mean that men will be trained only as well as women? If yes, do you feel it is advisable? No, it only means that women are being trained as well as the men. Those in favour say it is a sensible use of human resources. Those against it say it creates emotional and social stresses. (Mixed gender units, also, create especial problems for religious soldiers). Again, it’s a question of finding the right balance. In reference to haredim, more efforts are being made to provide facilities that meet their specific needs. I believe that these measures are marginally successful. Regarding Arabs, nothing at all has been done. |
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