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Tuesday, March 9, 2010 • Volume X, Number 2,292
WITH AHMADINEJAD’S FINGER ON THE TRIGGER In recent weeks, top officials in Syria and Lebanon, and the head of Hezbollah, have warned that Israel is preparing to attack them. The declarations have been greeted by denials from Jerusalem, but the atmosphere remains tense, and the Arab leaders have guaranteed Israel a “total” war in response, as Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem put it. In fact, I would suggest that we are witnessing the results of a deliberate decision by the Iranian leadership to provoke Israel into attacking Hezbollah. Such an attack would mean launching a war on Lebanon, and if Iran has its way, it would involve Syria, and destabilize the entire Middle East. Iran’s strategic goal is to trigger a war before it becomes the object of any serious sanctions at the UN Security Council, and before Israel or the United States decides to launch a military operation against its nuclear facilities. This is a move that Iran and its allies have been preparing for some time. Hezbollah is stronger today than it was before the Second Lebanon War, in 2006: It now possesses some 40,000 rockets and missiles capable of hitting Israel’s northern industrial area, Tel Aviv and the northern Negev. In addition, in recent weeks, Hezbollah has deployed advanced Syrian-made missiles on Lebanese territory. The new Lebanese government is again dominated by Syria. It has accepted the strategy of the “resistance” and feels empowered by Hezbollah’s military might. Syria has changed its traditional strategy of acting against Israel by proxy, and it too is ready to take the risk of a direct military confrontation, possibly with Iranian support.… According to an op-ed in the Gulf News by Sami Moubayed, editor-in-chief of Damascus’ regime-sanctioned Forward Magazine, Iran would not mind another war in Lebanon. There are certain radicals within Iran who are not pleased about the so-called “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah, which now plays an active role in national politics. They are “convinced that Hezbollah can strike back at Israel, surviving a war just as it did in 2006, inflicting maximal damage on Israeli cities and infrastructure.” These people believe Hezbollah would do well enough in a confrontation that the international community would think twice before pushing for another one with the organization—or, at a later stage, with Iran itself.… The trigger to war would likely be Hezbollah provocations: The Islamic organization blames Israel for the assassination of its military/terrorist commander, Imad Mughniyeh, in February 2008, and still promises revenge. Its deputy secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, said of late that avenging Mughniyeh’s death was “the least Hezbollah could do.” A deployment of sophisticated anti-aircraft systems by Hezbollah would also constitute a casus belli for Israel. In either case, Israel would be compelled to respond, not just against Hezbollah but against Lebanon generally, with the consequences being the promised Syrian intervention and regional expansion of the conflict. In a replay on a much larger scale of the Gaza events of June 2006 and the Second Lebanon War that followed, Iran would probably not intervene directly, but it could be expected to back terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets, to provide weapons support and financial and economic aid to its allies, as well as the promise of massive participation in subsequent reconstruction. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was scheduled to visit Damascus on February 25 for talks with Bashar Assad, supposedly to receive Damascus’ help to engage in a “constructive” dialogue with the West over Tehran’s contested nuclear program. In fact, Arab media were anticipating a meeting between Ahmadinejad, Nasrallah, senior leaders of the Lebanese opposition forces and Hamas’ Khaled Meshal. Such a meeting, said one press report, would serve as a clear message of “Iran’s support to them in the event of any Israeli aggression.” It is reasonable to assume that Ahmadinejad’s trip was actually intended to coordinate with Iran’s regional allies the planned attack on Israel. (Dr. Ely
Karmon is senior research scholar at the International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism THE BERLIN-DUBAI-TEHRAN AXIS Although
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ordered the increase of uranium
enrichment to 20%—bringing Tehran much closer to weapons-grade nuclear
material—China still opposes new United Nations sanctions. The
responsibility for stopping the Iranian bomb thus rests with a “coalition of
the willing.” The attitude of Germany—Iran’s most important Western
trading partner—will be critical to the success of such a coalition. But
while the recent announcement by Siemens and Munich Re to exit the Iranian
market have garnered headlines, hundreds of German manufacturers remain
determined to continue doing business as usual with Tehran. Much
of that business goes undetected via Dubai. Iran’s Mullahs use the United
Arab Emirates as a back door through which to funnel goods that cannot be
brought in through the front door because of existing sanctions. The role of
the German-Emirati Joint Council for Industry & Commerce, founded only
last year, on May 20, raises serious questions about the German government’s
commitment to meaningful sanctions.… This
state-funded institution…directly contradicts official German government
policies. Berlin publicly says it wants to deter or dissuade German firms from
doing business with Iran. Chancellor Angela Merkel even declared in November
2007 that “We have to do all we can to ensure that trade routes do not
simply take a diversion to get to Iran.” But this is precisely what the Iran
Working Group is trying to facilitate under the authority of the German
economics ministry. Has the Chancellor been informed? Dubai
is in fact already the “gateway to the Iranian market”—and not only for
German companies. The tiny emirate is considered to be the hub for much of the
world’s illegal trade with Iran. Virtually nothing is produced in Dubai and
yet, its activities have somehow catapulted the UAE to the top of the list of
countries exporting to Iran in 2009. An astounding 80% of all Emirati imports
are re-exported, one-quarter of which goes to Iran via Dubai. Some
8,000 Iranian firms and 1,200 Iranian trading companies are registered in the
emirate. Every week, about 300 flights shuttle between Dubai and Iran. Dubai
has one of the world’s largest artificial harbors, Jebel Ali, a mere 100
miles away from the Iranian container port of Bandar Abbas. Between 2005 and
2009, the value of goods exported from Dubai to Iran tripled, reaching $12
billion. In 2008, total German exports to the UAE reached $11 billion, an
increase of 40% over the previous year. In the vehicle construction and
mechanical engineering sectors, exports rose by more than 60%. The desire of
the German-Emirati Joint Council to open the “gateway to Iran” even wider
is therefore rather worrisome. On
Nov. 17, 2009, the Joint Council’s Iran Working Group met at Dubai’s
Monarch Hotel. The minutes of the meeting, which I have before me, describe
the proceedings and the mood of the 15 participants. There were many
complaints about the obstacles the U.S. has created to prevent them from doing
business with Iran.… The founding of the Iran Working Group only three
months ago is not just of anecdotal interest. With a crucial round of
international sanctions negotiations upcoming, the German government has a
choice to make. It can feign seriousness about sanctions in order to impress
the Israelis and Americans and discourage them from taking further action, or
it can put real pressure on Tehran in order to prevent the Iranian bomb. Let’s
hope it’s the latter. If Berlin’s assurances are sincere, then it must
close this “gateway to the Iranian market.” This means as a first step
bringing about the end of the Iran Working Group and the dismissal of the
executive officers of the semi-governmental German-Emirati Joint Council for
Industry & Commerce. Unless this happens, Mrs. Merkel’s assurances to be
counted among the “coalition of the willing” mean nothing. (Matthias
Küntzel is author of The Germans and Iran: The Past and Present of a
Fateful IRAN’S BRINKMANSHIP IS PAYING OFF On Tuesday, February 8, 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, announced that Iran began enriching uranium from 3.5 to 20% uranium-235. Iran claims that it needs this uranium for its Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor (TNRR). This announcement was made since the deal whereby Iran would receive fuel for its reactor in return for removing a significant amount of 3.5% uranium from the country did not materialize. Although the announcement specified a limited rate of enrichment, this statement has serious ramifications. The most obvious phenomenon is the repeated demonstration of Iran’s complete defiance of the international position regarding its nuclear development program. In spite of several IAEA Board resolutions, several UN Security Council resolutions, including three sanctions resolutions, Iran is continuing relentlessly with its nuclear weapons development project. Specifically, Iran continues to enrich uranium, until now to the 3.5% level, and now further to the 20% level. While it is true that the TNRR is fueled by uranium enriched to 20%, the enriched uranium must undergo a specific process to manufacture the fuel rods for the reactor, and it is not certain that Iran has the know-how and the technology to do this.… The original proposed deal would have exchanged some of Iran’s 3.5 percent indigenously enriched uranium for 20% enriched fuel. While the outcome of the deal would have been doubtful to the West, Iran would have benefited from it, since this was probably the only way it could have received fuel for its Tehran research reactor. The stocks of 3.5% enriched uranium would have been reduced, but these would be shortly replenished.… In any case, the failure of the deal gave Iran the excuse it needed for enriching its uranium to 20%, and therein lies the greatest danger to the outside world. For purposes of illustration, assume that approximately 3000 units of work are needed to produce 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90%, the amount and purity needed for a nuclear explosive device. Of these, some 2350 units are needed to enrich the uranium to 3.5%. Five hundred units are needed to further enrich the uranium to 20%, and only 150 units of work are needed to enrich the uranium from 20 to 90 percent. If the enrichment facility is ready, this last step can be accomplished in a matter of a few weeks. And this is what could happen if Iran builds up a stock of 20% enriched uranium. Recently, a debate has risen as to whether Iran has made a decision to assemble a nuclear “bomb” (missile warhead, aerial bomb, etc.). If not, Iran remains a “threshold” state, which could take this decision and then break out and produce nuclear weapons whenever the opportunity or the need arose. If Iran amasses a stock of 20% enriched uranium this discussion is superfluous, since the time between the initial move and the accomplishment of the task is quite short. In this time, and in order to discover the move towards assembling a nuclear weapon, the outside world must first gather the intelligence as to this fact. It then has to verify the facts, since a wrong decision based on false facts can be perilous. After the facts have been gathered and ascertained, decisions on how to react have to be taken, first by individual nations, and then on the international scale. Looking at the history of the long drawn out process behind international decisions on how to deal with the Iranian issue, one can only arrive at the conclusion that if Iran has a stock of 20% enriched uranium it can no longer be considered a threshold state, but a full-fledged nuclear power. This approach is essential, if preparations are to be made to deal with such a situation.… The wisdom of hindsight indicates that the October 2009 proposal by the US for the nuclear fuel deal only accelerated Iran’s program towards achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Had the talks concentrated on the larger issues, including uranium enrichment, and had the issue of supplying the Tehran reactor with fuel as the need arises been dealt with separately, it would have been more difficult for Iran to have the excuse it now ostensibly has to enrich uranium to 20%. If the world does not react quickly and competently now that the 20% enrichment operation began, the inevitable will be here before long. FACING IRAN: LESSONS LEARNED SINCE IRAQ’S 1991 MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL Today, in 2010, in the United States and the Western world there is a very real and acute awareness of the danger that Iranian nuclear activity—which is clearly designed to achieve a nuclear military capability—poses to the world, not just to Israel. Some people like to think that Israel has nothing to worry about because of the sizable Muslim population in the area and that the Iranians would not dare to cause massive destruction in an area where many Muslims might get injured or killed. However, as Prof. Bernard Lewis has said on a number of occasions, this kind of immunity is imaginary because radical Muslims are convinced that God knows how to tell the difference between Jews and Muslims. What Iran Learned from the Israeli Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor The Iranians learned a great deal from the destruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor by the Israel Air Force in 1981, which set back Saddam Hussein’s nuclear project very significantly.… The Osirak reactor was the key element in the Iraqi nuclear program: a single target which, when it was destroyed, set that program back very substantially. The Iranians saw this and they dispersed their nuclear program. There is no single element or target which, if destroyed, would substantially set back the Iranian nuclear program. Much of it is deep underground. So the Iranians have done their best to obtain immunity from the possibility of an aerial attack of the kind that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, making any military move, regardless of who might consider taking it, substantially more difficult. Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Osirak Attack I came to Washington as Israel’s ambassador in 1982, a little over a year after the destruction of the Osirak reactor. The atmosphere in Washington at the time was one of hostility, anger, even antagonism—and this was the Reagan administration, an administration correctly considered as very friendly towards Israel. The administration thought Israel’s action was ill-conceived, a mistake that could only cause problems rather than solve them. When I arrived in Washington there was talk of actually imposing sanctions against Israel as a reaction to this unilateral action by Israel against the Osirak reactor. After a few years the view in Washington on that particular action had changed completely. It is difficult to envision the Americans undertaking Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf in 1991 if the Iraqi nuclear reactor had still existed, if the Iraqi nuclear program had continued beyond 1981, and if that program had not been so seriously set back by the Israeli action.… People’s views changed with time, and what started out with feelings of antagonism and even hostility changed to strong appreciation for what was done for the benefit of everybody, certainly for the benefit of the Western world and, of course, Israel.… The Drive to Develop Missile Interceptors… Some say that while the missile we intend to intercept is a relatively cheap weapon, we are launching a very expensive weapon against it, which does not seem very wise at first sight. However, the damage that might be caused by the missile may far exceed the cost of the anti-missile system. Israel’s missile interceptor system poses a dilemma to anybody who decides to launch missiles against Israel, especially a missile that has a nuclear warhead. The dilemma is posed by the knowledge that the missile may very well be intercepted and thus expose the launching of a nuclear missile, even if it didn’t reach its target, which could bring about the response that could be expected for committing this deed. When this is taken into account, a decision might very well be made that this chance should not be taken and such a missile should not be launched. There are many ways of trying to fool a missile interceptor, such as the use of decoys and the use of maneuvering reentry vehicles that will try to escape the interceptor. But for every measure there is a countermeasure, and the people who are developing the Arrow system are taking all that into consideration.… Israeli Plans to Attack Iraqi Missile Sites… In order to neutralize the launching of the [Iraqi] Scuds [in 1991], it became clear very quickly that the only way this could be done would be by ground troops. Ground troops would have to search for the places where the launchers were being hidden and take action on the ground. That is no simple operation. It is 1,000 kilometers from Israel to Baghdad and it would involve landing ground troops in western Iraq.… I was for an Israeli response. I gave instructions to prepare a military operation in western Iraq, a very difficult and dangerous one, mainly because I thought it would be wrong for Israel to be hit without responding for the first time in its history. I thought this would send the wrong message to Israel’s enemies. In the meantime, we have taken actions against terrorists in military operations in the West Bank, Lebanon, and Gaza. So I don’t think that the fact that we did not respond during the Gulf War in 1991 permanently damaged Israel’s deterrent capability. (Prof. Moshe
Arens was Israel’s defense minister during the 1991 war with Iraq.
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